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Abstract 
This work presents a software behavioral model of the capabilities found in firewall type devices and a process for taking vendor 
specific nuances to a common implementation.  This includes understanding interfaces, routes, rules, translation, and policies; 
modeling them in a common manner such that different models may be compared to each other for functional similarity.  This 
work makes use of recent efforts to model firewall policies in a concise efficient data structure referred to as a Firewall Policy 
Diagram (FPD). The structure facilitates the canonical representation of a policy as well as human comprehension of the policy.  
Its use with behavior modeling is to capture and compare the results of a potentially large solution space. 
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1. Introduction 
This work presents a framework in which to model individual firewalls such that software based analysis and 
other formal analysis methods may be used with the model.  Some examples of industry uses for modeling a network 
and firewalls in software: 
• Network trace analysis for understanding how a packet will traverse the device without physically 
sending the packet.  In addition to an individual packet, a packet space in the form of an FPD may 
traverse the network to understand what will make it from point A to point B. 
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• Logical comparisons of firewall vendor implementations.  If two firewalls are configured to behave the 
exact same way but are from two different implementations, modeling the behavior of each vendor in 
software allows for the formal verification that each ingress and egress FPD are identical.  Subsequently, 
if they are not identical, the FPD used to traverse the spanning graph can show what is different from 
what is potentially a large solution space. 
• Behavior Abstraction Modeling of specific firewall vendors serves as the basis for automated translation 
from one vendors’ configuration to another with certainty of how the device will behave. 
• Participate in a larger software modeled network for more comprehensive simulations. 
 
The remaining sections include a brief description of the common behavioral components found in modern 
firewalls, how those common elements may be abstracted into a spanning graph, and then how that spanning graph 
may be used to experiment with device behavior. 
2. Modeling Firewall Behavior 
In a broad description, a firewall is a network device that is used to isolate an organization’s internal network 
from outside networks, allowing some packets to pass and blocking others. Firewalls allow two entities to connect 
their networks together through existing infrastructure and protocols, while securing the private networks behind 
them1. 
2.1. Behavioral Components of Modern Firewalls 
Traditional firewall capabilities were strictly focused on filtering traffic and applying the local security policy of 
an organization. Some firewalls were more sophisticated than others, but in general the filtering focused on an 
individual packet (packet filters), stateful packet flow (stateful filters), or application related traffic (application 
gateways)2. All of these capabilities are built on top of the known TCP/IP stack and the only goal is to accurately 
allow only the communication channels defined in the local policy. 
However, firewall vendors have continued to increase the scope of what defines a firewall. Looking at any 
modern firewall product today, one will typically find a combination of router, network address translation, and 
filtering capabilities. In addition, each of these sub-components may be broken down further into other elements 
such as virtual routers, embedded NAT inside of rules, and multiple filtering policies applied at different places. 
Therefore, for any abstraction of a firewall there must exist a mechanism to represent these capabilities so that 
accurate results may be computed. 
2.1.1. Interfaces 
An interface on a firewall is the physical network connection to the wire (or radio) that will transmit the traffic to 
and from the parties communicating2. In the strictest definition of the firewall and packet-filtering device, two 
network interfaces exist. This represents a physical separation between one network and another, requiring the 
traffic to flow through the firewall from one interface to the other and vice versa. However, as discussed in3, the 
firewall will typically have many more than two interfaces, which means that a firewall is no longer just a filtering 
device, but must also decide the appropriate egress interface for traffic. 
2.1.2. Security Policies 
A firewall will have single or multiple security policies to be applied to incoming or outgoing traffic. These 
policies are typically an ordered sequence of rules that follow the general form: 
predicate  decision 
The predicate defines a boolean expression over the fields in a packet tuple that are evaluated and the physical 
network interface from which the packet arrives. A decision is typically accept or deny with the possibility of 
additional actions, such as an instruction to log the action1. 
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2.1.3. Routes 
For this work, a route may be defined as a simple one tuple rule with a decision being the egress interface. The 
one tuple of the traffic being processed is the destination. For a particular routing rule, the destination can be 
identified as an IP Address, address range, or Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) format. Therefore, in a 
similar manner as security rules, the solution space can be split as the traffic is processed.  
2.1.4. Network Address Translation 
Network address translation (NAT) is a feature often offered by firewall and router vendors to solve a number of 
routing and addressing challenges in packet switched networks. NAT implementation will typically function as a 
translation table such that the inbound traffic will match an entry (either source or destination address) that is 
translated to another address on the egress side. The firewall device is then required to keep track of that 
conversation in order for response packets to have the reverse translation applied and arrive at the appropriate 
destination. There are typically three types of NAT: source address translation (SNAT), destination address 
translation (DNAT), and port translation (PAT). Each of these are roughly the same idea, and each will require a 
translation table, yet they will operate on different fields of the packet2. For example, a DNAT table will typically 
look like the following: 
Destination Address  Translated Address 
192.168.2.1  74.125.228.39 
10.1.1.10  157.56.237.251 
...  ... 
Then, when a packet arrives on an interface, it will look at where the packet is going and replace the destination of 
the packet with the appropriate translated address. 
3. Firewall Abstractions and Spanning Graphs 
When dealing with a firewall or network device, the entire goal of the broader network is to provide a path from 
point A to point B. Because the firewall is responsible for taking traffic in from one interface and sending it out 
another, there are internal paths that take the data through the various control and routing structures, as defined in 
the previous section. These paths and structures can be abstracted into behavior rules, behavior groups, interface 
switches and a spanning graph, which provides the links between the behavior groups and interface switches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Behavior spanning graph (a) without and (b) with a switch. 
3.1. Behavior Rules 
As a first step when considering how a particular firewall might process data, one typically thinks about the 
physical interfaces. Interfaces can be thought of as spokes off of a firewall allowing it to participate in a larger 
network. To model the internals, one must consider the elements we have defined: routes, security rules, and NAT. 
Essentially all three items may be thought of as predicates and actions. The predicate of all three types are over the 
known tuples or fields of an Internet Protocol and potentially TCP and UDP port, i.e., the source address, destination 
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address, source port and destination port. The actions that may be defined when the predicate matches are accept, 
deny, or next action; with two additional state transition operators: translate and egress interface. When a predicate 
matches, only one action may be applied (accept, deny, or next), however, any (or all) of the state transition 
operators may be applied. Using these elements and the initial link from the ingress interface, an internal spanning 
graph may be constructed generating a data path through the device and out the egress interface that may then be 
linked to the overall network spanning graph. These predicate  action constructs are identified as Behavior 
Rules. 
3.2. Behavior Group 
A behavior group is defined as a set of behavior rules such that they are processed top-down and the first 
matching predicate for a particular individual packet performs the associated action. The common use for a behavior 
group is the encapsulation of the larger ideas of a firewall. For example, it is common when modeling a particular 
vendor firewall to identify a routing behavior group or a security policy behavior group such that all corresponding 
routes or security rules are in that group, and may potentially be processed as one entity. 
In addition to providing a grouping mechanism for behavior rules, each behavior group possesses three overall 
actions: accept, deny, and default. These actions may be linked to the next group in the spanning graph, or 
potentially to the egress interface. The behavior group accept action will be applied to a traversing packet when the 
packet has matched a behavior rule predicate and the action is accept. In a similar manner, the behavior group deny 
action will follow the same logic but takes the deny path. Finally, the behavior group default action will be applied if 
no behavior rule predicate matches the packet. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Example behavior spanning graph with FPD.                                                 Fig.3: Example virtual router configuration 
3.3. Interface Switch 
An important concept we present to reduce the number of paths that must be represented in a spanning graph is 
the use of an ingress interface, an egress interface action, and an interface switch. Switches may be placed in the 
behavior group model to act upon two elements. The first is the inbound interface the traffic passes. The second is a 
matching state transition behavior rule that identifies the egress interface at some point in the spanning graph. The 
reason for providing this capability is that different firewall vendors make egress interface decisions at different 
times throughout the control flow. The egress interface sometimes will not impact the internal behavior groups 
traversed until the final step. Without having the means to act later on a state that was set early in the path, many 
duplicate paths and groups would be needed. Figure 1 demonstrates a spanning graph without and with an interface 
switch such that without an interface switch, the security policy group is duplicated. By using the switch in Figure 
1(b), the potentially large security policy group will only need to be modeled once. Figure 1(b) also demonstrates 
how the egress interface is selected in the routing group and then acted upon at the interface switch. 
Another reason that interface switches are useful is for firewalls that employ zone definitions. A zone in firewall 
language is typically the grouping of a number of interfaces into a logical area of the network. For example, eth0 
and eth1 are considered an internal zone with eth2 and eth3 in the unsafe zone. A vendor may then identify a 
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security policy when the traffic is passing from zone-to-zone and is specific to that zone-to-zone transition. In this 
example, there may exist a security policy that will need to be applied if the traffic arrives in the internal zone and is 
destined for the unsafe zone. Without an interface switch there would need to be a path for every interface-to-
interface combination. This is regardless if those interfaces shared the same zones, with the result being duplicated 
behavior groups and paths. 
Address and port translation provide another reason the interface switch provides a useful abstraction for when the 
egress interface is selected. Some firewall vendors will apply routes and security rules to the pre-translation packet, 
and some will apply them to the post-translation packet. This is an important distinction because in the case where 
the application of the routes is pre-translation, the subsequent security rules will need to be duplicated for every 
egress interface when an interface switch is not used. This is in a similar manner to what is seen in Figure 1, and an 
example of how an interface switch simplifies the processing and model. 
3.4. Spanning Graph 
All of the elements described form a directed acyclic graph rooted at the ingress interfaces with the leaves 
identified as the egress interfaces. This allows simulation of the traffic to be based on interface origination. This is 
also a mechanism to compare two firewall types that process traffic differently, but expect the same external results. 
Figure 2 is an example of the behavior elements coming together to form a behavior spanning graph. In subsequent 
sections we describe how traversing this spanning graph with the correct data structure will allow for a better 
understanding of the traffic that may pass the firewall. 
3.5. Modeling Sub Elements 
Until this point we have covered the general elements of the behavior abstraction model such that there was a 
single routing group, security policy group, or destination NAT group. However, the reality of modern firewalls is 
that they are often constructed of smaller elements that may be linked and reused. Constructs such as virtual routers 
and zone policies may easily be represented as their own behavior groups that are linked. For example, a virtual 
router is typically a routing table with an action of “next”, taking the processing to another group until finally an 
egress interface decision is made. Figure 3 diagrams this behavior group configuration such that the first routing 
group uses next action that matches the packet predicate in order to direct the processing path to the virtual router 
group. Once in the virtual router group, the egress interface is selected and processing continues to the next group. 
Furthermore, to illustrate the expressiveness of the behavior group model, zone-to-zone policies may be represented 
by using an interface switch before selecting the security policy to be processed, allowing the egress interface to be 
selected once during the model from the routing table and then used multiple times for selecting the zone policy, and 
then again to select the egress interface. This is in contrast to a less expressive abstraction that requires constructing 
the same security rules that will be applied for all possible interface-to-interface combinations. 
4. Modeling Traffic Solution Space 
In the previous sections we have gone through a detailed explanation of how individual elements of a firewall 
may be abstracted into a directed acyclic graph that may be traversed from inbound interface to outbound interface. 
This is useful for individual packet tracing; however, the more important capabilities come when used with a data 
structure capable of representing the entire solution space that a packet may represent. In this work we use the 
Firewall Policy Diagram (FPD). 
4.1. Firewall Policy Diagram 
A Firewall Policy Diagram (FPD) is a set of data structures and algorithms used to model a firewall policy into 
an entity allowing efficient mathematical set operations. The entity also has the ability to reconstitute the policy into 
a set of human comprehensible rules4,5. The FPD forms the base of the behavior-modeling engine and allows the fast 
and efficient manipulation of the packet space. This achieves a complete and thorough understanding of the space as 
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it comes in an ingress interface and exits another egress interface, yielding an accurate understanding of what traffic 
would have passed. 
The internal storage mechanism of a FPD uses Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDD or 
BDD)6,7. These data structures were introduced as an efficient way to capture hierarchical binary data and related 
works have described their use in firewall policy validation8,9,10. In a similar manner to the FIREMAN system9, 
policies and rules are modeled as variable sets represented as BDDs. Using a BDD is an efficient way to represent a 
Boolean expression, like (a  b)  c. Extending this concept to firewall policies, the variables in the expression 
become the bits of the associated IPv4 field. For our research, 32 bits representing the source address, 32 bits 
representing the destination address, 8 bits representing the protocol, and 16 bits representing the destination port. 
This means that for a particular accept space; there are 88 variables and 288 potential combinations of variable 
values. 
A full description of the algorithms involved with manipulation and extraction of human comprehensible rules 
can be found in related work4. 
4.2. Walking the Spanning Graph 
When considering how data will pass through a firewall device, they must first be accurately modeled using 
behavior groups. The next step to fully understand what will pass through a firewall configuration is to construct an 
FPD representing the entire solutions space, U, at each interface root. Then the spanning graph is traversed from 
root to depth with the FPD splitting at each path and changing as each behavior group is processed until it reaches 
the egress interface leaf. Each leaf FPD result may then be combined to produce the final FPD, representing an 
accurate space of what traffic can pass through the firewall and out of that interface. The process tests all possible 
scenarios through all inbound interfaces. 
It is this sort of formal verification that allows a firewall configuration team to be confident that they are not 
allowing any more access than the business requires and managing risk appropriately. Figure 2 demonstrates this 
operation visually by starting with an FPD at the root of the spanning graph, eth0 and eth1. As the FPD traverses the 
behavior groups a portion of the space ends up at the leaf interfaces, eth1 and eth0. The resulting FPDs at each 
interface represent the packet space that has passed through the device and out those individual interfaces. 
4.3. Performance: Avoiding the Linear Case 
When taking the behavior groups and behavior rules that make up each of the individual firewall entities, the 
initial idea of how traffic may be processed is linear. Meaning, one will process traffic as a true firewall does, 
attempting a match in a linear method, one behavior rule at a time to one packet at a time. While this is 
straightforward, it is also performance prohibitive as the full testing of a firewall configuration requires 288 × br. 
Where br is the number of behavior rules that exist in the device and the 288 is the solution space represented by an 
IPv4 packet. It becomes exponentially worse when dealing with IPv6. With a reformulation of each behavior group, 
the processing time may be bound to the number of decisions that must be made, as opposed to the number of 
behavior rules and the size of the address space. This same model may then be replayed for behavior groups that 
represent routing tables and NAT tables. The formulation of the problem is different, but is still a factor of the 
number of decisions that must be made. In a review of the routing behavior group, the decision to be made is what 
egress interface matches the traffic and with NAT, the addresses to be translated to. 
5. Experiments 
An experiment to test the performance of a common filtering and routing firewall was designed containing 
10,000 routes and 10,000 security rules with two interfaces, eth0 and eth1. The results show the time taken to test all 
possible packets through the simulated device was 210 milliseconds. A comparison with other model based testing 
tools show slower processing time with substantially smaller rule base sizes. Model-based conformance testing by11 
involves experiments with the experiment size of 7 rules generating over 700 test cases taking about 3000 seconds, 
and 4 networks adding an additional 20,000 seconds. A test case generation tool presented in12 indicates that the 
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number of tests generated is a cross product of the number of individual sources, destinations, and services found in 
the rule set, suggesting a much higher complexity when using this brute force method. Furthermore, experiments 
in13 show similar results when using a BDD as an internal representation of the policy, although the work was 
focused on model checking and not simulation. The results support the use of this behavior abstraction model and 
simulation in industry firewall configuration simulations. A sub-second simulation number is important because it 
will support further expansion of the behavior abstraction model such that it may participate in the larger network 
topology, both helping to verify and secure the organization. 
6. Related Work 
Brucker et al. (2008) presents a simple network modeling formalization with the common packet tuples found in 
many other works11,14,15,16,17,18,9,1,19,20. Brucker et al. (2008) uses a model based testing tool in conjunction with a 
testing framework that analyzes a single policy rule set and generates a list of test cases to be run against the actual 
firewall with an expected result11. The work focused on modeling a single policy with the experiment size of 7 rules. 
In a similar manner to our work,21 presents a firewall modeling framework based on Netfilter22 and the grouping 
mechanism. This work considers routing topologies and presents a method to condense a multi-policy and multi- 
device topology into a single policy with the representation of interfaces in the tuples of the model. They do not 
discuss packet translation or include it in their models. 
El-Atawy et al. presents a framework to generate test data for testing an actual firewall device. The work focuses 
on the ACL and does not cover the many other capabilities of modern firewalls (routes, NAT, etc.). While they 
focus on generating the smallest number of test cases based on network segmentation, there is also a behavioral 
modeling component to the effort. They use BDDs to check the rules for the appropriate network segments to 
include in the test, without a discussion of how data is extracted from the underlying model13. 
Frameworks capable of generating validation traffic for a particular firewall presented in several works23,12. In a 
similar manner to other topology mapping programs24,25, the work generates and sends actual traffic through the 
system, exercising a firewall’s internal filtering to ensure consistency. 
A survey of firewall modeling is presented by Zalvia26. This work demonstrates that the focus is typically on the 
individual firewall policy and some efforts on modeling the security posture as a broader inter-connected network. 
Further works describe the analysis engines that model security policies14,27,28. 
FIREMAN focuses on finding configuration anomalies in firewall policies. The primary similarity with our work 
is the extension of a group model that is also extended from Linux Netfilter22. The work suggests converting 
individual and networked policies into a linear group of processing that includes rules and links between firewalls9. 
Our work extends some of the concepts presented to cover NAT, interfaces, and routing tables. In addition, instead 
of enumerating all possible linear activities which might occur in a complex network, our work focuses on sharing 
paths through a spanning directed acyclic graph structure. 
The work most closely related to ours involves modeling attack graphs for exploitation of individual hosts in a 
network10. The effort uses a chains concept22 in portions of the work to reflect how a virtualized space might flow 
through an attack graph. In addition to ACLs, the work is able to model NAT and routes. They focus on a modeling 
attack vectors through a reduced attack graph. 
7. Conclusions 
In this effort we have presented a framework for modeling the known capabilities of modern firewalls such that 
the devices may be abstracted from the manufacturer specific implementation details. This abstraction allows a 
firewall to be modeled in a common manner in software, such that functional and configuration oriented testing may 
be achieved with more sophisticated plans than using a brute force, test all possibilities, approach that is seen today. 
In addition, this framework may be extended to assist in translation and migration from one vendor specific 
implementation to another, thus allowing the verification of the translation of complicated firewalls with certainty. 
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